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INTRODUCTION
Picture this: an elderly gentleman living alone, isolated in a rural,
midwestern locale. One day, this elderly gentleman awakes to find
a distinct rash forming on his chest. The nearest doctor capable of
performing an examination is located over a hundred miles away,
and this man has not driven more than ten miles in twenty years.
Shambling into his living room, the elderly man logs onto his
computer and begins typing. Within twenty minutes he is videoconferencing with a doctor who examines the rash remotely and
makes a diagnosis.1
Through advances in telemedicine, the scenario described above
is becoming an increasingly common occurrence, and, for many, a
life-altering opportunity.2 Yet many legal uncertainties exist in the
realm of telemedicine, particularly in regard to medical malpractice.3 Are doctors held to the same standard of care as they
would be in traditional medicine? What standard of care should a
court look to when a doctor, practicing over state borders via
telemedicine, finds himself enmeshed in a malpractice suit? When
is the physician-patient relationship established for the purpose of
determining malpractice liability? These uncertainties create
potential barriers to the widespread adoption of telemedicine

1. See Winifred V. Quinn et al., Using Telehealth to Improve Home-Based Care for Older
Adults and Family Caregivers, AARP POL’Y INST., May 2018, at 2, https://www.aarp.org/
content/dam/ aarp/ppi/2018/05/using-telehealth-to-improve-home-based-care-for-older-adultsand-family-caregivers.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F3X-JRU5] (describing home-based video visits
with specialists and primary care providers as a telehealth service).
2. See, e.g., Thomas Sullivan, The Expected Impact of Telemedicine on the Elderly, POL’Y
& MED. (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.policymed.com/2018/08/the-expected-impact-oftelemedicine-on-the-elderly.html [https://perma.cc/S6AT-X43H] (reporting that the company
BDO USA, LLP predicted that an increased usage of telemedicine services for seniors in
underserved communities would create greater access to medical services and lead to better
clinical outcomes).
3. See, e.g., Bonnie G. Ackerman, Is the Doctor In? Medical Malpractice Issues in the Age
of Telemedicine, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/doctormedical-malpractice-issues-age-telemedicine [https://perma.cc/6NMG-N5HD] (stating that
telemedicine creates unique malpractice risks that complicates malpractice claims).
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services.4 If these barriers are to be overcome, legislative action
must establish uniformity and certainty.5
Telemedicine has become the answer to that desperate question
of where to seek medical consultation and care, a question that has
long plagued rural American communities.6 Through telemedicine,
doctors are able to virtually see patients “face-to-face” using video
communication systems.7 Healthcare professionals can monitor
high-risk patients’ health parameters over long distances, diminishing the need to travel for routine testing.8 In short, telemedicine
presents the United States with a number of benefits, from reducing
the costs associated with traditional medical services,9 to providing
increased access to medical services in underserved communities.10
Despite the promising potential of telemedicine, the American
health system has been relatively slow to adopt this emerging
technology, though the utilization of telemedicine services increased
in recent years.11 One of the reasons for this slow uptake is the
4. See Christopher J. Caryl, Note, Malpractice and Other Legal Issues Preventing the
Development of Telemedicine, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 193 (1997) (stating that the uncertainty
of malpractice liability is an impediment to widespread telemedicine usage, as unsure physicians may not provide care to rural communities due to liability concerns).
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See Access to Health Services, HEALTHYPEOPLE (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.healthy
people.gov/2020/ leading-health-indicators/2020-lhi-topics/Access-to-Health-Services
[https://perma.cc/BU8V-SBCR] (stating that nearly 25 percent of Americans lack either
primary care providers or health centers that provide routine medical services); Healthcare
Access in Rural Communities, RHIHUB (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.ruralhealthinfo.org/
topics/healthcare-access#barriers [https://perma.cc/3KPL-NYYW] (detailing how a lack of
primary care providers in rural areas and the lack of access to hospitals presents significant
barriers to care for rural inhabitants).
7. See Quinn et al., supra note 1, at 2-3 (listing and explaining common forms of
telemedicine).
8. See id. at 2.
9. See Adelyn B. Boleman, Comment, Georgia’s Telemedicine Laws and Regulations:
Protecting Against Health Care Access, 68 MERCER L. REV. 489, 494 (2016) (describing how the
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) reduced costs for veterans suffering from a number
of conditions through the use of telemedicine). In 2012, the VHA estimated that around $6500
was saved per patient, amounting to almost $1 billion of system-wide savings that year. Id.
10. See Sarah Klein & Martha Hostetter, Using Telemedicine to Increase Access, Improve
Care in Rural Communities, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.common
wealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-article/2017/mar/using-telemedicine-increase-accessimprove-care-rural [https://perma.cc/52VJ-43JN].
11. Compare MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, Mandated Report: Telehealth
Services and the Medicare Program, in REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY
471, 473 (2018), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/mar18_medpac_ch16_
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traditional lack of healthcare coverage for a broad range of telemedicine services.12 This barrier gradually dissipated over the last
decade as coverage expanded.13 As the usage of telemedicine
increases,14 the legal uncertainties that characterize telemedicine
malpractice should be resolved in order to attract the greatest
number of skilled medical professionals.15 Without legal certainty,
or by the adoption of overly plaintiff-friendly precedent and legislation, these practitioners may be disincentivized from participating.16
This Note argues for uniformity in the physicians’ standards of
care for the purpose of determining malpractice liability, arguing
for an approach that holds doctors practicing telemedicine to a national standard that considers the differences between virtual and
in-person care. This Note additionally argues that the factors which
establish the physician-patient relationship for the purpose of determining telemedicine malpractice liability should be clearly delineated through legislation. Part I will lay out the elements that
plaintiffs must establish in a medical malpractice case, identify the
major differences in how jurisdictions determine the appropriate
sec.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BR2-VRBA] (“The use of telehealth services under the PFS has
grown rapidly in recent years but remained low in 2016. Between 2014 and 2016, telehealth
visits per beneficiary increased 79 percent. In 2016, 108,000 beneficiaries accounted for over
300,000 telehealth visits totaling $27 million in spending. These amounts were 0.3 percent
of Medicare FFS Part B beneficiaries and 0.4 percent of Medicare PFS spending.”), with Phil
Galewitz, Medicare Slow to Adopt Telemedicine Due to Cost Concerns, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(June 23, 2015), https://khn.org/news/medicare-slow-to-adopt-telemedicine-due-to-costconcerns/ [https://perma.cc/BKY6-ZAC7] (stating that Medicare paid only about $5 million for
telemedicine services in 2012).
12. See Hana Sahdev, Can I Skype My Doctor? Limited Medicare Coverage Hinders
Telemedicine’s Potential to Improve Healthcare Access, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1813, 1827-28 (2016)
(discussing limitations to reimbursement for telemedicine services under Medicare, including
limiting reimbursement to only certain healthcare practitioners); Galewitz, supra note 11
(“[T]he traditional Medicare program has tightly limited telemedicine payments to certain
rural areas. And even there, the beneficiary must already be at a clinic, a rule that often
defeats the goal of making care more convenient.”).
13. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 11, at 479.
14. Given the current trends, an increase in usage seems inevitable. Even the notoriously
tightfisted Medicare program is beginning to increase coverage of telemedicine services. See
Eric Wicklund, CMS Proposes More Medicare Reimbursement for Telehealth, RPM, MHEALTH
INTELLIGENCE (July 13, 2018), https://mhealthintelligence.com/news/cms-proposes-moremedicare-reimbursement-for-telehealth-rpm [https://perma.cc/68NP-8AWG].
15. See Caryl, supra note 4, at 198.
16. See id.
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standard of care, and discuss differences regarding the establishment of the physician-patient relationship for malpractice cases.
Part I will also address the negative consequences of the lack of uniformity regarding telemedicine. Part II will argue for uniformity
and clarity, proposing that Congress should enact legislation which
establishes or encourages an appropriate telemedicine standard of
care and clarifies the formation of the physician-patient relationship
in such circumstances. Part III will address several avenues of federal action that could institute the desired changes to telemedicine
malpractice standards, balancing them against each other to
determine the most practical approach.
I. PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY LACK OF UNIFORMITY IN
TELEMEDICINE MALPRACTICE
While the application of malpractice standards differs in subtle
ways from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there are generally four
components to a malpractice claim: (1) the defendant medical practitioner owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) the practitioner
breached his or her duty by deviating from the standard of care;
(3) the breach caused recoverable damages to the plaintiff; and
(4) there was a causal relationship between the breach and injury.17
Beyond these four components, most jurisdictions recognize that
there must be an established doctor-patient relationship for there
to be a duty of care owed to a patient.18 In terms of relevancy to
telemedicine malpractice, differences in establishing the relevant
standard of care and how jurisdictions recognize the establishment
of a doctor-patient relationship are vitally important.
This Part first explores the differences in how jurisdictions
establish the standard of care for the practice of telemedicine, and
how the existence of these differences is detrimental to the public
policy goal of increased access to medical care. Then this Part
highlights the relative lack of consensus and clarity in how the
doctor-patient relationship is formed in certain situations and the
problem this poses.
17. See, e.g., Stephen McDonald, Where Does It Hurt? The Practice of Telemedicine Beyond
State Lines and Personal Liability, 11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 553, 562 (2017).
18. See, e.g., id.
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A. Differences: Standards of Care
No matter the jurisdiction, in order for a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice case to be successful, he or she must establish that the
defendant-physician deviated from a specific standard of care.19 This
is typically accomplished by bringing in an expert witness to testify
to the court about what that standard was and how it was breached.20 Generally, the standard of care differs from one medical specialty to another,21 regardless of whether the physician provided
care on-site or remotely.22 A major point of concern for the purposes
of this Note is the disparity in how jurisdictions establish the standard of care within whatever specialty is being practiced.
1. The Locality Rule vs. National Standard of Care
There are several overarching ways that jurisdictions establish
the standard of care of a physician: either the standard of care is set
at a local level, based on what standard a physician practicing
medicine in that locality would be held to, or it is set at a national
standard within a particular specialty.23 The locality rule “requires
that an expert testifying be from the defendant’s same community
and compare the actions of a physician to the applicable standard
in the community or locality in which healthcare services are provided.”24 On the other hand, the national standard of care requires
the physician to provide a patient with “care comparable to the care
provided to patients anywhere in the United States, regardless of

19. See Brian K. Cooke et al., The Elusive Standard of Care, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 358, 359 (2017).
20. See, e.g., Shirley v. McCraney, 241 F. Supp. 2d 677, 682 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (holding that
the plaintiff could not sustain a medical malpractice claim without expert witness testimony
establishing that the defendant-physician deviated from the standard of care).
21. See Cooke et al., supra note 19, at 360.
22. See Jarred Kibbey, Note, Health Law—A Call for the Arkansas General Assembly to
Modernize the Standard of Care Requirement in Medical Malpractice Cases, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 673, 684 (2014).
23. See Cooke et al., supra note 19, at 361.
24. Boleman, supra note 9, at 511.
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the skill and knowledge of the particular professional and the area
in which the care is provided.”25
Currently, courts in most jurisdictions recognize a national standard of care, though several states adhere to some vestige of the
locality rule.26 The state courts that recognize the locality rule
generally cite the desire to protect doctors who practice in rural
communities.27 Rural physicians are assumed to lack the same
access and knowledge as doctors practicing in major metropolitan
areas.28 As the locality rule fell into disfavor,29 some states that
maintain the rule adjusted it to fit more readily into the modern
medical landscape,30 while others left it largely untouched.31
The national standard of care and the locality rule represent one
of two variables used to determine the standard of care in a
jurisdiction.32 The other variable, dubbed by one scholar as the
“means of comparison variable,”33 refers to the way in which the
25. Tristan Serri, Comment, An Examination of the Impact of Malpractice Law on
Telepsychiatry Clinicians & Clients with Suicidal Ideations, 50 AKRON L. REV. 933, 944 (2016).
26. See Cooke et al., supra note 19, at 361 (stating that forty-five states follow a national
standard of care in medical malpractice cases, while five states follow some form of the
locality rule).
27. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, No. 08-6537, 2009 WL 4641747, at *1, *6 (6th Cir.
Dec. 8, 2009) (Rogers, J., concurring) (“The purpose of the strict locality rule was to relieve
rural or small town doctors of the necessity of practicing up to a big city standard when that
was not reasonably required.”).
28. See, e.g., id.; Cooke et al., supra note 19, at 359-60 (“It was believed that rural
practitioners lacked the equipment of the urban health centers and did not benefit from the
latest advances in science and practice that emanated from medical research conducted at
urban hospitals.”).
29. See Cooke et al., supra note 19, at 361.
30. See, e.g., Boleman, supra note 9, at 513 (describing Rhode Island’s modified “similar
locality” rule as setting a standard of care which reflects the degree of care taken by physicians practicing the same type of medicine in similar localities); Bradley J. Kaspar, Note,
Legislating for a New Age in Medicine: Defining the Telemedicine Standard of Care to Improve
Healthcare in Iowa, 99 IOWA L. REV. 839, 847 (2014) (stating that physicians in Iowa are held
to a reasonable-physician standard, and the factfinder may consider the locality of the physician, but the standard is not explicitly set at the local level).
31. See, e.g., Boleman, supra note 9, at 511-12 (stating that Idaho’s strict locality rule
holds the practicing physician to the same standard of care as physicians practicing in the
community where that care took place).
32. Kaspar, supra note 30, at 845 (“Two variables determine the traditional standard of
care within a given jurisdiction: (1) the means of comparison between the conduct of the
defendant-physician and other physicians, and (2) the pool of physicians that the defendantphysician is compared to.”).
33. Id. at 846.
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conduct of the defendant-physician in a malpractice case is compared to that of other physicians.34 The traditional “custom-based”
standard compares a particular physician’s treatment to the customary medical treatment when determining whether the physician
acted within the bounds of “industry norms.”35 Many states have
diverged from using the custom-based means of comparison and,
instead, utilize the reasonable-physician standard.36 This standard
considers whether the defendant-physician acted as a reasonable
physician would have under similar circumstances.37
In terms of the usage of telemedicine services, determining the
standard of care is of vital importance for the treating physician.38
Differences in the standard of care can be problematic for physicians
who use telemedicine services to provide care outside of the state in
which they practice.39 Such differences could burden physicians by
forcing them to learn and follow numerous standards of care, potentially to the point where they must familiarize themselves with
subtle nuances in the standards present in specific townships and
counties.40 This risk of liability is likely detrimental to the widespread use of telemedicine, as health providers may avoid using
telemedicine services to treat patients outside of their jurisdiction.41
While legislative bodies in many jurisdictions have already ad-

34. Id. at 845.
35. Id. at 846.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Brandon Ge, Telehealth and Standards of Care, TECHHEALTH PERSPECTIVES (May
13, 2013), https://www.techhealthperspectives.com/2013/05/13/telehealth-and-standards-ofcare/ [https://perma.cc/9Z2W-24PH] (stating that it is “critical” that healthcare providers
know the standard of care that applies in order to protect themselves from malpractice
liability).
39. Id.
40. See Kibbey, supra note 22, at 682.
41. See Caryl, supra note 4, at 193 (stating that the uncertainty of malpractice concerns
is an impediment to widespread telemedicine usage, as unsure physicians may not provide
care to rural communities due to liability concerns).
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dressed standards of telemedicine care,42 others are still scrambling
to address the issue.43
2. In-Person Care vs. Telemedicine Care
Beyond the jurisdictional differences in the standards of care for
traditional in-person medical practices, there are additional differences in how states determine the appropriate standards of care for
telemedicinal practices. Those states that have addressed the
telemedicine standard of care generally favor an approach which
sets the standard at the same level as a physician practicing traditional in-person care.44 This holds true for those states still in the
process of enacting legislation addressing this standard of care.45
Yet Hawaii presents an exception to this approach: its relevant
statute establishes that a physician’s treatment recommendations
made through telemedicine are held to the same standards as recommendations made “in traditional physician-patient settings that
do not include a face-to-face visit.”46
The implication of the differences between these approaches is
that a physician practicing telemedicine in a state such as Texas
may be held to a higher standard of care than a physician practicing
telemedicine in Hawaii.47 If a locality rule state adopts statutory
language similar to Texas’s, its courts would likely hold the
practicing physician to the same standard of care as a physician
42. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-1.3(c) (2018) (“Treatment recommendations made via
telehealth ... shall be held to the same standards of appropriate practice as those in
traditional physician-patient settings that do not include a face-to-face visit.”); 22 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 174.6(a)(1) (2019) (stating that health practitioners providing healthcare services
through telemedicine services are held to the same standard of care as health practitioners
providing such services in an in-person setting); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3303(B) (2019) (stating
that for the prescribing of controlled substances through telemedicine services, the standard
of care must conform to the standard of care observed during in-person care).
43. See Erik Wicklund, North Carolina Lawmakers Ready to Take on New Telehealth
Legislation, MHEALTHINTELLIGENCE (May 21, 2018), https://mhealthintelligence.com/news/
north-carolina-lawmakers-ready-to-take-on-new-telehealth-legislation [https://perma.cc/Z2DTRVZT].
44. See, e.g., 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 174.6(a)(1).
45. See Wicklund, supra note 43 (stating that a yet-to-be-enacted bill will hold telehealth
standards of care to the same level as in-person care).
46. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-1.3(c).
47. See Kaspar, supra note 30, at 856 (indicating that Hawaii’s statutory language creates
a lower standard of care than a state that enacts legislation similar to Texas’s).

1514

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1505

practicing in-person, and in the same locality as the patient for
whom the care was provided.48 New York is an example of a state
that applies a locality rule and holds physicians practicing telemedicine in that state to the same standard of care as a physician
practicing traditional in-person care.49
On the reverse side, if a physician practicing in a locality rule
state used telemedicine to practice in a state that observed a
national standard of care, they may find themselves held to a
potentially higher standard of care.50 This may dissuade such
physicians from utilizing telemedicine services. Studies show that
more modern techniques are adopted by states which replace their
locality rule with a national standard of care.51 Such trends indicate
that physicians do respond to changes in the malpractice standard
of care by implementing more current practices.52 This lends support
to the argument that the locality rule may be hindering the
adoption of telemedicine services where it is observed.
While there is currently a dearth of settled case law regarding
standard of care determinations in interstate telemedicine malpractice cases,53 case law indicates that courts would first look to

48. This assertion relies on the finding that a physician practicing telemedicine is subject
to the laws of the state in which the patient resides. This has not yet been established by case
law but would likely be determined by a state court absent legislation addressing the issue.
See J. Kelly Barnes, Telemedicine: A Conflict of Laws Problem Waiting to Happen—How Will
Interstate and International Claims be Decided?, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 491, 524 (2006) (“[M]ost
courts will usually end up applying their own local law in an effort to protect their local citizen
and to provide the easiest mode of determination.”).
49. Boleman, supra note 9, at 510-11.
50. This situation goes against the purpose of the locality rule, which is meant to protect
rural physicians. See Caryl, supra note 4, at 197.
51. Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 317, 371-72 (2015) (stating that the differences between local and national usage for
various procedures was narrowed by 40 to 60 percent after states switched from a local to
national standard of care).
52. Id.
53. The lack of settled case law is not indicative of a lack of such suits, but reflects the fact
that most malpractice suits settle. See Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better than
Going to Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08
law.html [https://perma.cc/87RJ-J9WA] (stating that 80 to 92 percent of medical malpractice
suits settle). The terms of these settlements are usually subject to nondisclosure agreements,
making it even more difficult to find relevant information and statistics. See Gregg Stevens
& Lorin Subar, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements Point/Counterpoint: Confidentiality
Is a Virtual Necessity, 29 GPSOLO 24, 28 (2012).
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state law to determine the appropriate standard of care.54 In White
v. Harris, the Supreme Court of Vermont reviewed a case in which
a psychiatrist engaged in a ninety-minute consultation with a patient via videoconference and submitted recommendations for a
treatment plan to the patient’s treatment team.55 That patient later
committed suicide, and the plaintiffs filed a malpractice suit, alleging that the care provided by the psychiatrist fell below the
required standard of care.56 While this case primarily focused on
whether a doctor-patient relationship was established by videoconference,57 the court did address the standard of care to a degree.58
The court indicated that the general standard of care was set by
state statute,59 though it did not expound upon the particulars of the
standard of care.60 This reveals that the courts do look to statutory
provisions for guidance on the standard of care for telemedicine
malpractice cases.61 Therefore, if state law equates the standard of
care for telemedicine to that of traditional in-person care, as a
majority of states do,62 then the courts would defer to the statute
rather than adhering to the established common law.63
A major issue with equating the standard of care of a telemedicinal practice to that of in-person care is the fact that physicians may have an increased chance of misdiagnosis if they are
unable to perform an in-person exam.64 While settled case law has
54. See generally White v. Harris, 36 A.3d 203, 205, 207-08 (Vt. 2011); MacDonald v.
Schriro, No. CV 04-1001-PHX-SMM (MHB), 2008 WL 4277828, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2008).
55. 36 A.3d at 204.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 205.
58. Id. at 207-08.
59. Id. at 207 (“Under 12.V.S.A. § 1908(1), a doctor must exercise ‘the degree of care
ordinarily exercised by a reasonably skillful, careful, and prudent health care professional
engaged in a similar practice under the same or similar circumstances,’” whether or not
within the State of Vermont. (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12. § 1908 (West 2018))).
60. Id. at 208 (stating that it was not the court’s responsibility to determine the standard
of care at the time of the proceedings).
61. The phrase “overall standard of care” here refers to the national versus local standard
and custom-based versus reasonable-physician standards.
62. See Kaspar, supra note 30, at 855.
63. See White, 36 A.3d at 207.
64. Paul Spradley, Telemedicine: The Law Is the Limit, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
307, 329 (2011) (stating that patients may be at an increased chance of misdiagnosis if doctors
and patients do not have a physical encounter, which may lend to arguments that the
physician may be held to a higher or lower standard of care).
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not directly addressed this problem, the facts of MacDonald v.
Schriro illustrate the issue.65 In MacDonald, a medical malpractice
case stemming from a telemedicine conference, a plaintiff-prisoner
injured his knee after falling from his bunk.66 The plaintiff received
an MRI and saw the defendant-physician through a telemedicine
videoconference.67 During that appointment, the plaintiff wore long
pants and remained seated, as the defendant-physician did not
require him to stand in order to demonstrate mobility.68 Based on
the appointment, the defendant-physician failed to order any form
of surgery, instead recommending that the plaintiff wear a knee
brace and take anti-inflammatory drugs.69 Three years later, the
plaintiff again saw the defendant, and the defendant ordered a
surgery which resulted in a loose bone fragment being removed from
the plaintiff ’s knee.70 The defendant had previously overlooked this
bone fragment.71
The court ultimately rejected the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment for the medical malpractice claim, citing in part that a
jury could find that the physician did not perform an exam and
reviewed the wrong MRI results.72 In this particular case, the
physician’s wrongdoing is clear in regard to reading the incorrect
MRI, but there is still the question of the examination. The
defendant-physician in this case claimed in his medical report that
a “physical examination” revealed mobility in the plaintiff ’s knee,73
but what if the proper standard of care for an in-person examination
required that the knee be physically touched by the doctor? If state
statutory law held the standard of care for telemedicine examinations to the same level as in-person examinations, then the doctor
would likely be found to have violated the proper standard of care
simply by using the telemedicine service to perform the examina65. No. CV 04-1001-PHX-SMM (MHB), 2008 WL 2783472, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2008).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at *3.
73. Id. at *11. It is assumed that the reference to a physical examination in this case
refers to a demonstration of mobility, not a physical interaction between the defendant and
the plaintiff.
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tion. It may be more difficult for a physician to diagnose a condition
like this via telemedicine services. Yet, in situations where a qualified doctor is not readily available, it is likely that some level of
care is preferable to none at all.74
The United States clearly has a fractured approach to the
standard of care for medical practitioners. This is the result of fifty
states independently establishing their own standards, though the
country has moved toward uniformity in recent years.75 To alleviate
physician concerns with regard to telemedicine malpractice, there
needs to be greater uniformity.76 Furthermore, the current majority
approach of holding telemedicine physicians to the same standard
as physicians practicing in-person does not consider the inherent
limitations of telemedicine.77 This may cause concern among physicians who wish to utilize this increasingly popular practice.
B. Establishing the Doctor-Patient Relationship
As mentioned previously, for a medical malpractice case to be
successful, a physician-patient relationship must be established in
order for the physician to hold a duty of care toward the patient.78
This relationship is widely viewed as contractual in nature, either
being established expressly by a written contract, or implied
through the conduct of the doctor and patient.79 While not necessarily problematic for malpractice cases involving traditional care,80
uncertainty remains as to when this relationship is established in

74. This is not meant to be construed as support for questionable medical practices, so
much as an illustration of the problems that can arise when applying an infeasibly high
standard of care to telemedicine practice.
75. See Cooke et al., supra note 19, at 361.
76. See Caryl, supra note 4, at 193.
77. See supra Part I.A.2.
78. See Phyllis Forrester Granade, Medical Malpractice Issues Related to the Use of
Telemedicine—An Analysis of the Ways in Which Telecommunications Affects the Principles
of Medical Malpractice, 73 N.D. L. REV. 65, 68 (1997).
79. Id.
80. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 563-64 (describing ways in which courts have
established the physician-patient relationship in traditional care).
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telemedicinal care.81 This uncertainty should be resolved if doctors
are to utilize telemedicinal services without undue fear of liability.82
Without legislation determining the formation of the physicianpatient relationship, the existence of the relationship is determined
on a factual basis and will vary from case-to-case, even being left
entirely for the jury to decide.83 As it so happens, many states have
enacted some form of statute or issued policy statements addressing what steps must be taken before a physician-patient relationship has been formed in a telemedicine encounter.84 That said, it
appears that many of these are not meant to define the relationship
for the purpose of determining malpractice liability, but establish
the steps that a physician must take in order to properly participate
in telemedicine services.85 Presently, common law appears to
determine when this relationship forms for the purpose of determining malpractice liability.
At common law, courts varied in their determinations of what
conduct establishes a physician-patient relationship.86 Despite
these variations, it is relatively clear that physicians will not be able
to escape malpractice liability by claiming that the lack of an inperson meeting or examination precludes the physician-patient
81. See Marilyn L. Higdon, Trading Your Health: Assessing the Need for Domestic
Regulation of Telemedicine and Ability to Conform to U.S. Trade Agreements, 30 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 393, 411 (2018) (“Telemedicine has made it exceedingly difficult to
establish duty by removing the physical proximity and hands-on care present in the
traditional doctor-patient relationship.”).
82. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 566 (indicating that a legislative approach that
definitively establishes when the physician-patient relationship is formed via telemedicine
could help avoid liability).
83. Id. at 565-66.
84. 50-State Survey: Establishment of a Patient-Physician Relationship Via Telemedicine,
AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2018-10/ama-chart-telemedicinepatient-physician-relationship.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6W7-92N6].
85. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1769D(a) (2017) (“Physicians may practice
telemedicine and telehealth. Provided that telemedicine shall not be utilized by a physician
with respect to any patient in the absence of a physician-patient relationship.”).
86. Compare Hord v. United States, No. CA-96-3401-7-13, 1999 WL 249061, at *4 (4th Cir.
Apr. 28, 1999) (holding that the physician must offer some benefit to the patient in order for
the relationship to be formed, and that even an examination does not establish the
relationship unless there was an agreement to benefit the patient), with Bienz v. Cent. Suffolk
Hosp., 163 A.D.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that a telephone call to a doctor’s
office regarding the beginning of treatment may be sufficient to create a physician-patient
relationship).
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relationship.87 The relationship is likely formed when the patient
has sought medical care from a physician and both the physician
and patient agree to that care.88 The relationship is most likely established without the need for an in-person meeting.89
A potential issue arises when a physician-to-physician consultation occurs through telemedicine.90 In these scenarios, the physician
does not actually interact with the patients, and such consultations
generally do not form the physician-patient relationship.91 Despite
this, it appears that doctors who provide anything more than a mere
consultation may expose themselves to malpractice liability by establishing the relationship, even if they never spoke with the
patient.92 Therefore, doctors walk a fine line when they take part in
such practices, and telemedicine may further complicate matters, as
prior cases generally dealt with consultation via telephone.93 With
the current telemedicine technology, the consulting physician may
have the opportunity to be “virtually present” in the patient’s room,
as opposed to simply speaking with the treating physician over the
telephone.94 This may create further uncertainty for physicians as
to whether they are consulting with another physician or providing
recommendations and treatment, thus establishing a physicianpatient relationship.95 This uncertainty may be addressed by
uniform standards that clearly state when the relationship has been
formed.
II. UNIFORMITY OF THE TELEMEDICINE STANDARD OF CARE AND
ESTABLISHMENT OF PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
In order for telemedicine to reach its maximum potential, the
current differences in the standards of care and establishment of the
physician-patient relationship must be resolved. First, this Part will
87. See LYNN D. FLEISHER & JAMES C. DECHENE, TELEMEDICINE
§ 1.04[3][a][i] (2011).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at § 1.04[3][a][ii].
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See id.
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argue for the national adoption of a uniform standard of care for
telemedicine practices that reflects Hawaii’s statutory approach,96
does away with the locality rule,97 and utilizes the reasonablephysician standard as opposed to the custom-based standard.98
Adopting such a standard will incentivize the use of telemedicine
and more properly reflect the potential limitations of current technology. Next, this Part will argue for the creation of a national
standard for the establishment of a physician-patient relationship
through telemedicine that clearly explains when the relationship
has been formed for the purposes of determining malpractice
liability.
A. The Appropriate Standard of Care for Telemedicine
Due to the interstate aspects of telemedicine and the unique
issues implicit in its usage,99 the proper standard of care for its
practice should reflect a national reasonable-physician standard,
while doing away with the intricacies involved in balancing national
standards with locality rules. Furthermore, the majority approach
of holding physicians that utilize telemedicine to the same standard
as physicians practicing traditional in-person care should be abandoned,100 and Hawaii’s approach should be adopted in its stead.101
The federal action needed to institute these changes will be
addressed in Part III.102

96. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-1.3(c) (2018) (“Treatment recommendations made via
telehealth ... shall be held to the same standards of appropriate practice as those in
traditional physician-patient settings that do not include a face-to-face visit.”).
97. See supra Part I.A.
98. See supra Part I.A. In his Note, Legislating for a New Age in Medicine: Defining the
Telemedicine Standard of Care to Improve Healthcare in Iowa, Bradley Kaspar argues a
similar point, but his recommendations were focused on the state of Iowa, while this Note
argues for the adoption of the standard at a national level, resolving all state discrepancies.
See Kaspar, supra note 30, at 861-64.
99. See supra Part I.A.
100. See, e.g., 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 174.6(a)(1) (2019).
101. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-1.3(c).
102. To clarify, this Note only proposes legislative adjustments for telemedicine, not for inperson care, due to its unique interstate potential.
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1. The Appropriateness of the National Reasonable-Physician
Standard
First, the locality rule creates uncertainties among physicians
who wish to provide care across state lines, making it a problematic
impediment to the widespread usage of telemedicine.103 Abandoning
the locality rule, at least for the practice of telemedicine, would
maximize telemedicine’s potential and introduce useful health
services to underserved populations.104 The argument that the locality rule protects rural practitioners is no longer relevant now that
we have nationally standardized medical training, and in light of
telemedicine’s growing prominence.105 Therefore, legislation establishing a new standard of care for telemedicine practices should
reject any form of the locality rule and replace it with the modern
national standard.106 A majority of states would likely support this
proposal, as most jurisdictions have already abandoned the locality
rule.107 Such a measure potentially heightens the standard of care
for some physicians, as the national standard is often a higher
standard than that of a rural locale with limited resources.108
Therefore, adopting a national standard of care for the practice of
telemedicine accomplishes two public policy goals: (1) eliminating
a point of concern for physicians, thereby incentivizing the usage of
telemedicine, and (2) pressuring all telemedicine practitioners to
hold themselves to a higher standard of care, ensuring that they
educate themselves about national standards and updated practices.
Second, legislation establishing the uniform telemedicine
standard of care should adopt a reasonable-physician standard
103. See supra Part I.A.1.
104. See, e.g., Boleman, supra note 9, at 519 (“Anything short of uniformity across states
not only burdens physicians and creates higher compliance costs for companies promoting
telemedicine, it also disadvantages potential plaintiff-patients and inhibits the full expansion
of health care services for patients in rural areas.”).
105. See id. (“[T]oday we have a national accrediting system, which has contributed to the
standardized medical school training all throughout the country. The justification provided
150 years ago for a locality rule or a rule based on similar communities cannot be reconciled
with the realities of telemedicine, technological advancement, and modern health care practices.”).
106. Id.
107. See Cooke et al., supra note 19, at 361.
108. This is not necessarily the case, but the standard justification for the locality rule is
to protect rural practitioners who may not be up to date. See id. at 359-61.
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as opposed to a custom-based standard. The reasonable-physician
standard is a logical choice for an emerging medical practice such as
telemedicine.109 The reason for this is that the custom-based approach determines the appropriate standards of care using wellestablished practices as the benchmarks.110 It is therefore a difficult
and ineffective approach to use for assessing the standards of an
emerging medical practice.111 One potential outcome of applying the
custom-based approach would be that, under the approach, all new
telemedicine practices would lie outside the standard of care.112
While this is an extreme outcome, courts applying such a standard
would likely run into difficulties determining appropriate customs.113 This approach does not promote ingenuity in the medical
field, and would likely hinder it.114 Physicians may hesitate to
participate in new telemedicine practices if there are uncertainties
regarding the standards of care, even if those practices offered
improved patient outcomes.115
Unlike the custom-based standard, the reasonable-physician
standard requires that physicians perform as reasonable physicians
would in similar circumstances in order to avoid malpractice liability.116 Because of this, the reasonable physician standard does not
implicate the emerging medicine concerns of the custom-based
approach.117 Freedom from outdated customs may allow physicians
more flexibility—with fewer liability concerns—permitting the
adoption of updated practices.118 This would facilitate the public
policy goal of promoting the most cutting-edge treatment options, as
physicians may be less likely to shy away from new telemedicine
practices.119

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See McDonald, supra note 17, at 555-58.
See Kaspar, supra note 30, at 846.
See id. at 853.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Ackerman, supra note 3; Caryl, supra note 4, at 193.
See Kaspar, supra note 30, at 846.
See id. at 853.
See id.; Caryl, supra note 4, at 193.
See Caryl, supra note 4, at 193.
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2. Telemedicine vs. In-Person Care: The Propriety of Hawaii’s
Approach
As telemedicine becomes increasingly utilized and related legislation is promulgated, it is important that the legislation considers
the inherent differences between in-person care and telemedicine
care. Currently, a majority of state legislatures equate telemedicine
care to traditional in-person care for the purpose of establishing the
appropriate standard of care.120 Hawaii presents an exception to this
rule, establishing that recommendations made through telemedicine
“shall be held to the same standards of appropriate practice as those
in traditional physician-patient settings that do not include a faceto-face visit.”121 Considering the potential differences in diagnostic
capabilities of a physician examining a patient through telemedicine
services versus a physician examining a patient in person, Hawaii’s
statutory language is a more appropriate approach if the goal is to
incentivize usage.122 As one scholar acknowledges:
If application of this standard requires that a physician, in order
to comply with the standard of care, must detect everything he
or she would have during an in-person examination, the
standard would significantly disincentivize providers' use of
telemedicine because the lack of an in-person examination
necessarily inhibits the diagnostic ability of physicians.123

It is true that the diagnostic capabilities of a physician remotely
examining a patient are more limited than those available during
the performance of an in-person exam.124 A physician is unable to
employ all five senses when using telemedicine services, meaning
that the examination may be considered incomplete.125 This, in turn,

120. See Kaspar, supra note 30, at 855; see, e.g., 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 174.6(a)(1) (2019).
121. HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-1.3(c) (2018).
122. See Kaspar, supra note 30, at 856.
123. Id. (footnotes omitted). When Kaspar refers to “this standard,” he is referring to the
standard that holds physicians practicing telemedicine to the same standard as in-person
care. See id. at 855-86.
124. Id. at 859.
125. Id.
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can lead to a greater potential for misdiagnosis.126 Such a scenario
is an inherent risk of practicing through telemedicine.
Potential critics of Hawaii’s approach may claim that the adjusted
standard of care is an attack on the quality of care being provided.127
The quality of care is unlikely to significantly suffer though. This
approach is not intended to unfairly target patients by degrading
the standards of care to their minimal level, but to create realistic
standards of care that reflect current technological capabilities.128
Under the proposed standards, courts would simply be able to consider the technology’s fundamental limitations instead of blindly
holding telemedicine practices to the same standard as in-person
practices.129
Despite the risks, the potential benefits offered by telemedicine
far outweigh the possibility of isolated incidents of misdiagnoses.130
Telemedicine facilitates greater access to care for rural citizens, care
that they might otherwise have had to do without.131 Both rural and
urban doctors may consult with more knowledgeable specialists
from thousands of miles away, potentially making the difference
between life and death for some patients.132 The benefits are not
limited to rural inhabitants, as urban individuals also benefit from
the convenience of checkups from the comfort of their homes or the
remote monitoring of their vitals.133 Greater adoption of telemedicine can dramatically reduce healthcare costs, and both doctors
and patients can avoid costs associated with missing work and
traveling.134 These considerations alone should outweigh the potential risks and support a statutory scheme that incentivizes the
usage of telemedicine.

126. Id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 856.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 857-58 (listing cost and time savings, reduction in travel, alleviation of physician
shortages, convenient treatment of chronic conditions, and reduction in spreading of disease
as benefits).
131. Id. at 858.
132. Id.
133. See Quinn et al., supra note 1, at 1-4.
134. See Boleman, supra note 9, at 494 (stating that the Veterans Health Administration
(VHA) estimated that system-wide savings totaled nearly one billion dollars in 2012 through
the VHA’s use of telemedicine); see also Kaspar, supra note 30, at 857.
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For these reasons, legislation establishing the appropriate
standard of care for telemedicine practices should adopt a national
reasonable-physician standard, with a provision holding practitioners of telemedicine to a standard of care that reflects the limitations of telemedicine technology. Hawaii’s statute provides an
adequate template for the latter component, though greater specificity may be warranted if such legislation is implemented at the
national level.
B. Uniform Determination of the Physician-Patient Relationship
While common law standards traditionally determined the formation of the physician-patient relationship,135 the jurisdictional
differences—and the potential difficulties of applying law developed
around traditional care to telemedicine—support the argument
that legislation should clearly delineate how this relationship is
formed.136 As a general rule, courts will look to statutory law over
common law where the two conflict.137 A statutory provision clearly
demarcating the physician-patient relationship for telemedicine
malpractice cases should be accepted by courts, just as they look to
such legislation when determining the appropriate standard of
care.138 The implementation of such legislation would alert physicians as to when they have an established duty to their patients,
providing them with more certainty as to what actions would expose
them to malpractice liability.139 If the states uniformly instituted
such legislation, another level of certainty would be provided for
physicians, alleviating their concerns and removing a barrier to the
increased usage of telemedicine across state boundaries.140

135. See, e.g., Hord v. United States, No. CA-96-3401-7-13, 1999 WL 249061, at *4 (4th Cir.
April 28, 1999).
136. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 565-66.
137. See, e.g., Hickerson v. Vessels, 316 P.3d 620, 623 (Colo. 2014) (“Where the interaction
of common law and statutory law is at issue, we acknowledge and respect the General
Assembly’s authority to modify or abrogate common law, but only recognize such changes
when they are clearly expressed.”).
138. See, e.g., Britt v. Taylor, 852 So. 2d 1128, 1132 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (looking to state
statute for standard of care).
139. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 566.
140. See Caryl, supra note 4, at 193.
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Oklahoma’s law provides a partial model for such legislation.141
In the statute’s relevant part, it states that the duties of a
physician-patient relationship do not apply “until the physician
affirmatively ... [u]ndertakes to diagnose and treat the patient; or
... [p]articipates in the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.”142
Clearly predicating the formation of the relationship on the
affirmative action of the physician—as was done here—could help
alleviate physician fears of accidentally assuming liability. The
statute also includes a limitation: “A physician-patient relationship
shall not be created solely based on the receipt of patient health
information by a physician.”143 A provision such as this would help
clarify, both to physicians and to courts, that the receipt and review
of patient records, without more, does not establish a duty to the
patient in telemedicine malpractice cases.
While this is a good starting point, the proposed legislation should
also address the steps needed to “undertake” and “participate” in
the diagnosis and treatment. This would help distinguish a physician who owes a duty of care from a mere consultant in situations
where the telemedicine physician is interacting with another
physician, and not the patient.144
III. INITIATING THE CHANGES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
Given the current status of malpractice standards in the various
states, it is unlikely that the states will adopt uniform standards on
their own.145 Therefore, the federal government will need to initiate
the adoption of the proposed standards. First, this Part will argue
that Congress could utilize the Commerce Clause in order to
institute the desired changes, but this method would likely be challenged by the states. Next, this Part will argue that Congress could
use its Spending Power to create uniformity by encouraging states
to pass legislation instituting the proposed telemedicine malpractice
141. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 478.1(D) (2019).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 87, § 1.04[3][a][ii]. While this Note does not
propose language for these steps, a comprehensive review of the states’ common law
determinations, combined with a review of typical medical practices in different fields, could
provide guidance.
145. See supra Part I.A.
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standards. An approach that would threaten to cut funding and an
approach that would create additional funding will be considered.
This Part will ultimately propose that an approach utilizing Congress’s Spending Power to provide additional funding in order to
encourage state action would be the most likely to survive the
Supreme Court’s scrutiny if challenged.
A. The Commerce Clause as a Method of Creating Uniformity
The Telehealth Modernization Act of 2015 reveals that there is
precedent for legislation that institutes federal telemedicine standards,146 but Congress did not address the standard of care issue
and deferred to the states on this matter.147 That proposed legislation further used permissive language that would allow states
substantial leeway as to whether they would adopt Congress’s
proposals.148
While that legislation was never enacted, it does show that
members of the federal legislature are aware of state discrepancies
in telemedicine issues and wish to reconcile these differences in a
way that facilitates broad usage of telemedicine services.149 It is
interesting that the proposed goal of this legislation was to facilitate
broad telemedicine usage,150 yet the bill refused to address the
appropriate standard of care and framed its language in such a
permissive manner.151 It is likely that the authors of this bill had
constitutional concerns in mind, given that states have generally
regulated their own healthcare for over one hundred years under
the authority of the Tenth Amendment.152 Yet telemedicine diverges
146. See generally H.R. 691, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposed bill).
147. Id. at § 3(c)(2) (stating that nothing in the proposed legislation should be construed
to “affect the standard of care for medical or clinical appropriateness as established by State
law or policy”).
148. See id. at § 3(b) (“The following are conditions for the delivery of health care through
telehealth by a health care professional to an individual that States should consider adopting.” (emphasis added)).
149. See id. at § 2 (acknowledging the benefits of telemedicine and that the variations in
state approaches create impediments to widespread adoption).
150. Id.
151. See id. at § 3(b), (c)(2).
152. See, e.g., Samuel P. Clancy, Removing Barriers to Telehealth in Oklahoma: Increasing
Access to Care and Improving Health Outcomes Across the State, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 805, 813
(2016).
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from the traditional practice of medicine, and its potential usage for
interstate medical treatment presents a valid argument that it
deserves to be regulated at the federal level.
It is true that states have generally retained the power to
regulate the health of their citizens, but this power is not
absolute.153 The traditional argument made for the preservation of
state regulation over matters of health is that the police power
granted by the Tenth Amendment protects such regulation.154 Yet
in the aftermath of the Affordable Care Act, Congress has received
increasing deference in matters related to its Spending Powers and
the Commerce Clause.155
As one scholar notes, “Under the Commerce Clause, Congress
may regulate or license telemedicine as a channel of interstate
commerce, as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or as an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, even over
Tenth Amendment objections.”156 This indicates that the federal
government can regulate telemedicine malpractice, as it could
readily be found that state discrepancies in this area limit the
interstate usage of telemedicine.157 As doctors are typically reimbursed for such care, the flow of money between states is a strong
basis to argue that Congress could utilize the Commerce Clause to
institute telemedicine malpractice reform at the federal level.158
That said, states desiring autonomy and maintenance of the traditional police power protections would likely attack such an approach
as unconstitutional.159
Even if Congress has received increasing deference in the wake
of the Affordable Care Act, states have a long history of regulating
the health of their constituents and view such regulation as “a
153. See, e.g., id.
154. See, e.g., Bill Marino et al., A Case for Federal Regulation of Telemedicine in the Wake
of the Affordable Care Act, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 274, 297 (2015).
155. See id. at 296-97.
156. Id. at 304 (footnotes omitted).
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. See James F. Blumstein, A Perspective on Federalism and Medical Malpractice, 14
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 411, 425 (1996) (“The Supreme Court has construed the Commerce
Clause so broadly that large-scale federal intervention in the medical malpractice area is
almost certainly constitutionally valid.”).
159. See id.; Marino et al., supra note 154, at 296-97 (discussing possible constitutional
challenges to federal malpractice reform).

2020]

TELEMEDICINE AND MALPRACTICE

1529

quintessential component of [their] sovereign powers.”160 If Congress
utilizes the Commerce Clause to implement the suggested standards, states may view this as an attack on state sovereignty and
challenge it at every step.161 Instead, a gentler approach could incentivize state action as opposed to forcing it.162 Such an approach
allows states to maintain their health regulation autonomy while
creating greater uniformity at the national level.163
B. The Spending Power as a Method of Creating Uniformity
Congress’s utilization of its Spending Power presents a more
viable—and less coercive—approach to achieving uniformity by
incentivizing the adoption of the proposed standard of care and
physician-patient relationship standards. In fact, Congress enacted
a similar piece of legislation in the past, in the form of the Telemedicine Incentive Grants statute.164 This statute, no longer in
force, gave the Secretary of Health and Human Services authority
to provide grants to state licensing boards that cooperated with
other states to reduce telemedicine barriers.165
Congress’s passage of federal legislation incentivizing the
adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one is one of the
most notable examples of Congress successfully creating uniformity
through its Spending Power.166 This statute allows the federal
government to withhold a percentage of federal funding for federal
highway maintenance if states allow persons under the age of
twenty-one to purchase alcohol.167 In South Dakota v. Dole, South
Dakota famously challenged the constitutionality of this federal
160. Marino et al., supra note 154, at 296 (quoting Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011)).
161. See id. at 296-97 (claiming that states would challenge any federal attempt at
implementing national licensure reform for medical practitioners through the Commerce
Clause).
162. See infra Part III.B. (discussing the use of Congress’s Spending Power to incentivize
adoption of the proposed standards).
163. See infra Part III.B.
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 254c-18 (2012).
165. Carmen E. Lewis, My Computer, My Doctor: A Constitutional Call for Federal
Regulation of Cybermedicine, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 585, 607 (2006).
166. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012); see also Mark Seidenfeld, The Bounds of Congress’s
Spending Power, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2019).
167. See 23 U.S.C. § 158(a).
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action.168 There, the Supreme Court held that this was a valid use
of Congress’s Spending Power, but established several limitations.169
These limitations are that: (1) the power must be used for the
“general welfare”; (2) the conditions for receipt of the funds must be
stated clearly; (3) the funding and the imposed conditions are connected to some degree; (4) the conditions cannot infringe upon the
states’ constitutional rights or force them to violate individuals’
constitutional rights; and (5) the incentives offered cannot be so coercive that they force state action.170
Applying this standard to legislation that incentivizes the adoption of the proposed uniform standards, it is clear that constitutional violations can be avoided. First, establishing uniformity
in telemedicine malpractice standards is a benefit to the general
public.171 The benefits of a broad adoption of telemedicine services
are numerous, and the current lack of uniformity in telemedicine
malpractice standards presents an impediment to its broad adoption.172 The proposals would advance the general welfare, as both
doctors and patients would benefit from more widespread telemedicine usage, and there is the potential for enormous system-wide
savings.173 Importantly, the Supreme Court gives significant deference to Congress when determining whether the spending is being
utilized for the general welfare.174 This further supports the conclusion that such legislation would pass the first prong of the Dole
analysis.175
In order to pass the second prong of the Dole analysis, Congress
must unambiguously assert the conditions on which the receipt of
the federal funds is predicated, so that “the States ... exercise their
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”176 In Dole, the Court found that Congress easily met this
standard by requiring the states to adopt a minimum drinking age

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987); Seidenfeld, supra note 166, at 11.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-12.
Id.
See supra Part I.A-B.
See supra Part I.A-B.
See supra Part II.A.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
See id.
Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
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of twenty-one in order to receive specific federal highway funds.177
With regard to uniformity in telemedicine malpractice standards,
Congress would simply need to clearly condition the receipt of
federal healthcare funding, whether Medicaid, Medicare, or some
other health-related funding, on states passing legislation instituting the desired standards for telemedicine malpractice.178 Such
federal legislation would clearly establish the state action needed to
receive the healthcare funding, allowing the states to make an
informed decision. Barring poorly worded provisions, Congress
should be able to meet the second prong of Dole without trouble.179
The third prong of Dole is another which could easily be satisfied
by linking the receipt of funding to a federal program such as
Medicare, Medicaid, or another health-oriented program. While the
Supreme Court has determined that there must be some connection
between the funding and the conditions, it has not established exacting standards for how related the funding and conditions must
be.180 In Dole, the Court found that Congress met the third prong, as
receipt of the specified federal highway funds was conditioned upon
the adoption of a uniform drinking age of twenty-one.181 The
reasoning behind this was that instituting a uniform drinking age
of twenty-one was “reasonably calculated” to advance Congress’s
goal of facilitating safe interstate travel, a goal that was impeded by
the lack of state uniformity.182 As federal highway funds are expended, in part, to facilitate safe interstate travel, the conditions
and funding were held to be sufficiently connected.183
The connection between federal healthcare funds and telemedicine malpractice standards should be even more clear than that
of highway funds and drinking ages. For example, federal courts
have established that the purpose of the Medicaid Act is to aid
states in providing assistance to “aged, blind or disabled individuals,
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of

177. Id. at 208.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 208 n.3 (stating that the Supreme Court has not determined the limits of
the relatedness prong).
181. Id. at 208-09.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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necessary medical services.”184 If Congress conditions the receipt of
such health-oriented funding on the adoption of uniform telemedicine malpractice standards, it could readily point out that the
states’ lack of uniformity dissuades qualified physicians from utilizing telemedicine.185 Congress could then argue that limiting
disabled and indigent patients’ access to telemedicine services
impedes the purposes of such medical assistance funding. The
proposed telemedicine malpractice standards would therefore be
posed as a solution to the impediment, and would likely be sufficiently related to the purpose of the funding.186 Similar arguments
could be made for Medicare funding and other health assistance
programs.
The fourth prong of the Dole analysis also should not present a
significant problem. Encouraging states to adopt a uniform telemedicine standard of care and physician-patient relationship
standard would not force them to commit any unconstitutional acts
or violate any individual’s constitutional rights. The proposals in
Part II of this Note are largely based on standards already adopted
by some jurisdictions, and there have not been any successful constitutional challenges to these standards.187
States could challenge federal regulation of telemedicine malpractice standards on Tenth Amendment grounds,188 but such a
challenge was rejected in Dole.189 There, the Court held that the
Tenth Amendment did not preclude Congress from using federal
funding to encourage constitutional state action, such as enacting
a uniform drinking age.190 A similar holding could be expected for
the use of federal funds to encourage uniformity in telemedicine
malpractice standards.
In terms of Dole’s fifth prong—the coercion prong—there is a
potential issue regarding the method of encouraging states to adopt
telemedicine malpractice standards. In a case addressing the
184. In re Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 585 (10th Cir. 1984).
185. See supra Part I.A-B.
186. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09.
187. See supra Part II.
188. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
189. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
190. See id.
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Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion provisions, the Supreme
Court held that Congress’s Spending Power did not allow it to withdraw Medicaid funding if states did not participate in the
expansion.191 This holding reveals that the Court carefully scrutinizes the withholding of important health-related funding, as such
withholding can implicate coercion.192
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a provision in the Affordable Care Act that required participation in Medicaid expansion.193
There, the Court found the requirement unconstitutional, noting
that not complying with the expansion would lead to the withdrawal
of all existing federal Medicaid funding.194 Chief Justice Roberts
determined that the states were not actually given a choice as to
whether they would join in the expansion, as the withdrawal of all
Medicaid funding could result in a loss of over 10 percent of a state’s
budget.195 This would make the provision unduly coercive, and
therefore not within the scope of Congress’s Spending Power.196
Despite the holding in NFIB, Congress could avoid being unduly
coercive by limiting the withholding of federal funds to a small
percentage of funding, as was done for the statute that led to the
adoption of a uniform drinking age.197 While there is no explicit
guide for determining the limits of what the Court considers unduly
coercive, NFIB reveals that withholding 10 percent of a state’s
overall budget is far too high.198 That said, withholding a smaller
percentage of federal funding from some healthcare-oriented program, perhaps around 5 to 8 percent, may not stray into the territory of coercion.199 Such a withholding would likely not represent
even 1 percent of a state’s overall budget, but would likely be
significant enough to encourage action.200 This could still pose an
191. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 530-31 (2012).
192. See id. at 581-82.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(B) (2012) (limiting the withholding of funding to 8 percent
of the total highway funding).
198. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 523.
199. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
200. If, as in NFIB, the entirety of the federal government’s Medicaid funding represented
approximately 10 percent of a state’s total budget, withholding less than 10 percent of that
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issue though, as the Court held in NFIB that Congress cannot take
away a state’s existing Medicaid funding for its refusal to take part
in a new program.201 Whether the Court would treat other healthoriented programs in a similar manner is open to debate.
One scholar proposes a solution to this issue: “Instead of attaching telemedicine licensure reform to an existing program, drafters
might position it as a ‘new program,’ attach a separate funding
stream to it, and make applying for it wholly discretionary.”202 While
the proposals in this Note do not address licensure issues, a similar
approach can be taken. In this approach, the proposals for uniformity in the standard of care and the determination of the physicianpatient relationship become part of a more expansive program.
Congress could then offer additional funding as an incentive for
states’ adoption of the program, as opposed to threatening to withhold funding.203 This solution would also avoid the ethical issues
inherent in the withholding of funding from important healthcare
programs.
A question raised by this solution is whether it would be a strong
enough incentive to bring states into uniformity. If the additional
funding was marginal and purely discretionary, the states may not
opt to enact new legislation just to receive an extra droplet in an
already full bucket. That said, few states would consider their
healthcare funding to already be a full bucket. For example,
Connecticut’s retirement healthcare fund for state employees is
currently in a $36 billion deficit,204 and a number of other states face
similar deficits in this area.205 If Congress were to identify and

Medicaid funding would equate to less than 1 percent of the state’s total budget.
201. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 585; Marino et al., supra note 154, at 336-37. The proposals in
this Note may not run into this problem, as this Note is not necessarily advocating for a “new
program,” but it is an issue to be wary of.
202. Marino et al., supra note 154, at 337.
203. See id.
204. Marc E. Fitch, Connecticut Has $36 Billion in Unfunded OPEB Liabilities, YANKEE
INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.yankeeinstitute.org/2018/03/connecticuthas-36-billion-in-unfunded-opeb-liabilities/ [https://perma.cc/J4M8-28H9].
205. See, e.g., Jim Miller, California’s Retiree Healthcare Liability Grows to Almost $77
Billion, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 25, 2017, 1:52 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article128736099.html [https://perma.cc/4BAQ-A99R].
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target such programs for additional funding, states would likely be
incentivized to take the steps necessary to secure the funding.206
Overall, Congress likely has the authority to establish, or at least
encourage, uniformity as proposed in this Note, either through the
Commerce Clause or through its Spending Power.207 The Commerce
Clause, while a potential avenue, is not the preferable method of
enacting these changes, as it would likely be challenged by states
wishing to protect their autonomy.208 Congress could utilize its
Spending Power, on the other hand, to incentivize the adoption of
the proposed standards.209 The proposed changes should pass the
Dole standard, and concerns regarding the withholding of federal
funds from important healthcare programs could be avoided.210
These concerns could be avoided by framing the legislation as creating a new program which offers additional funds as an incentive
to adopt it, and in turn the proposed standards.211 Alternatively, and
for the sake of simplicity, the legislation could threaten to withhold
a marginal amount of funding from Medicare, Medicaid, or another
health-related program, though this approach has the potential to
cross into the realm of coercion.212 While there may be other options
available, the ones presented above are the most likely to survive
the Supreme Court’s scrutiny if challenged.
CONCLUSION
There are many potential benefits to the widespread adoption of
telemedicine services, but concerns related to the lack of national
uniformity in malpractice standards prevents telemedicine from
reaching its full potential. The presence of numerous standards of
care and jurisdictional differences in how the physician-patient
relationship is formed are two issues which present novel problems
to physicians who may wish to practice medicine across state lines,

206. This Note simply uses state retirement healthcare funds as an example. Other
programs operating in a deficit could be targeted for additional discretionary funding.
207. See supra Part III.
208. See supra Part III.A.
209. See supra Part III.B.
210. See supra Part III.B.
211. See Marino et al., supra note 154, at 337.
212. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585 (2012).
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and therefore may discourage them from participating.213 In order
to resolve these problems, Congress should encourage a national
reasonable-physician standard of care through legislation, doing
away with the locality rule for telemedicine. This standard of care
should additionally reflect the inherent differences between traditional in-person practices and telemedicine practices, using
language similar to Hawaii’s relevant statute214 in order to create a
standard of care that does not expose physicians to undue liability.
Congress could quell further legal uncertainties by adopting a
uniform standard for physician-patient relationship determinations
which clearly states the steps needed to form the relationship in
telemedicine scenarios. As the necessary legislation would pass the
Dole standard, Congress may use its Spending Power as the basis
for the proposed legislation, and with proper precautions, this
legislation would not be found unconstitutional if challenged in
court.
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